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Pricing and product cycles for Intel's chips also changed in the mid-1990s. As shown in the top panel of figure 1, price contours for Intel's chips became steeper around 1995. Because most price index formulae boil down to functions of weighted averages of price change, steeper price contours translate directly into more rapidly declining price indexes. Hence, the inflection point reflects the change in the contours seen beginning in 1995. At the same time, the product cycle for MPUs-the length of time chips are sold in the market-shortened and Intel began to introduce chips more frequently. This is seen in the lower panel, where horizontal lines depict the lifespans for Intel's chips, plotted against the speed of the chip.
What caused these changes in pricing and product cycles? This paper provides a stylized model that shows a set of conditions under which an increase in Moore's Law is consistent with both of these stylized facts. In the model, an increase in Moore's Law raises the quality of future chips relative to today's chips. Under the assumption that consumers view these chips as substitutes, increases in the quality of tomorrow's chips push down the prices for today's chips and can, thus, generate an inflection point in the price index. With regard to product cycles, the model predicts that increases in the rate of product introductions and reductions in chips' market lives can simply be a monopolist's profit-maximizing response to an exogenous increase in Moore's Law. Thus, the model provides support for the Moore's Law hypothesis. However, because substitution possibilities are the lever that generate these predictions, the model also suggests that changes in the attributes of contemporaneous substitutes can have the same effects. Thus, the model suggests that increases in the quality of competitor's chips can generate an inflection point through the same channel. This is an important possibility to consider because Intel came under increasing competition from AMD beginning in the mid-1990s, and the model suggests that this increase in competition could have contributed to the observed inflection point.
I. Price Contours and Inflection Points
A simple stylized model is developed to explore these possibilities. Quality is exogenously determined and evolves exponentially so that the quality of a chip introduced at time t is Q(t)=e qt . But, there are fixed costs incurred when a chip is introduced (I c ) so that chips are introduced only occasionally. For simplicity, it is assumed that the firm produces only one chip at a time and that all of its chips live for A periods, so that over some period of length M, C=M/A chips are introduced. Under these assumptions, the quality level associated with chip c=0,1,..C is Q(c) = e q(Ac)
, since (Ac) periods transpire between the introduction of chip c=0 and that of chip c.
The price that consumers are willing to pay for chip c aged a periods is given by:
where 0<s<1 is the slope of the (logged) price contour. Note that, in this context, a constant-quality price index declines at the rate s over time so that changes in prices that feed through P(Q) only affect the level of the prices and do not affect the rate of price change. Therefore, in this context, an inflection point requires a change in the slope of the price contours. Thus, if the slope is specified as a function of the pace of quality change, s=s(q), where increases in q make the contours steeper: ∂s(q)/ ∂q>0, then, an increase in q can generate an inflection point. Algebraically, this occurs because older chips experience sharper price declines than younger chips so that the price contours pivot when q changes: ∂ln P c,a /∂q = -(∂s/∂q)(a).
Consider two arguments to support the notion that changes in Moore's Law can generate inflection points. First, suppose that MPU markets are populated by heterogeneous buyers and that Intel engages in inter-temporal price discrimination-it sells first to those with a high willingness-to-pay, then sequentially lowers prices to sell to those with lower willingness to pay. As explained by Joel Dean (1969):
"Launching a new product with a high price is an efficient device for breaking the market up into segments that differ in price elasticity of demand. The initial high price serves to skim the cream of the market that is relatively insensitive to price. Subsequent price reductions tap successively more elastic sectors of the market.
This pricing strategy is exemplified by the systematic succession of editions of a book, sometimes starting with a $50 limited personal edition and ending up with a 25-cent pocket book." (P. 174) In this view, an increase in q causes price contours to pivot because buyers of older chips are more sensitive to the presence of substitutes than the early adopters.
The alternative argument-that does not require consumer heterogeneity-is that prices of older chips are more sensitive than those of new chips simply because older chips are "closer" to the available substitutes. So, for example, the inter-temporal substitution between today and tomorrow's chips is more intense as the new chip's arrival nears. This is, thus, one way to explain why prices for older chips-those closer in time to the arrival of the new chip-are lower than prices for newer chips. Moreover, it suggests that increases in q will cause price contours to pivot because substitution intensifies as the good gets "closer" to its substitutes.
II. A Simple Model
To assess conditions under which an increase in Moore's Law can shorten product cycles and increase introduction rates, it is necessary to use the model to assess how increases in q affect the firm's profit-maximizing choices for the length of market lives and the number of product introductions. To that end, assume that the rapidly declining prices discussed above force the firm to produce at capacity. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence for this industry and has been used in previous models of the semiconductor industry (e.g., Ken Flamm (1989) ). The other assumption is that capacity and, hence, output is fixed over time. This assumption is admittedly problematic because there are thought to be important learning economies for semiconductors, especially for devices sold in highly competitive markets (notably, memory chips). However, industry data suggests that learning effects are less important for MPUs (Aizcorbe(2002) ).
The firm's problem is to choose the number of chips to introduce (and thus the length of each chip's market life) over the M periods so as to maximize profits over that period. To form an expression for profits over the M periods, note that the price contours above imply the following expression for revenues collected over the life of each chip c: Surprisingly, the first order conditions do not include a term to measure changes in revenue that occur when introducing more chips alters the amount of time between introductions (AC) and, thus, changes the quality levels associated with each chip. This is because-through integration-the term that captures quality effects-(1-e qM )/qM-is an average of the quality effect over all periods. Because the time period is fixed (at M), the average quality level does not change with changes in the number of introductions.
III. Effects of an Increase in Moore's Law
The model predicts that an increase in Moore's Law (q) will prompt a monopolist to increase the number of chips introduced over the period. Tracing through this effect, an increase in q steepens price contours and pushes down prices of all the chips. This lowers the marginal revenue of adding more chip introductions because all chips now sell at a lower price (∂MR(C)/∂q<0). However, the prices of older chips fall disproportionately more than those of younger chips, so that marginal cost falls more than marginal revenue (∂MC(C)/∂q<∂MR(C)/∂q). With marginal revenue exceeding marginal cost at the new q, the firm returns to equilibrium by increasing chip introductions until the first order condition is satisfied. In effect, the increase in q lowers the cost of product introductions and, thus increases the incentive for the firm to introduce more chips. The end result is a new equilibrium where more chips are introduced over the M periods and where each chip has a shorter market life.
Extending the model to allow for the possibility that "waiting" is a negative attribute of future chips yields similar results, except that the effect on the length of the product cycle is magnified. With waiting as an attribute, the slope of the price contours (ii) could have prompted Intel to increase the rate of product introduction and shorter each chips' product cycle. However, the assumptions required to generate this result suggest that an increase in competition can generate the same results. Because these competing explanations have different implications for the sustainability of the increase in productivity growth, future work is needed to study these possibilities in a more rigorous fashion. Source: Aizcorbe (2004) 
